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This paper measures the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs in the U.S. natural gas distribution
market during the period 1991-2007. We find large departures from marginal cost pricing in all 50
states, with residential and commercial customers facing average markups of over 40%. Based on
conservative estimates of the price elasticity of demand these distortions impose hundreds of millions
of dollars of annual welfare loss. Moreover, current price schedules are an important pre-existing distortion
which should be taken into account when evaluating carbon taxes and other policies aimed at addressing
external costs.
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Energy plays a central role in determining our overall economic well-being, from heating and
cooling our homes and businesses to determining the cost and composition of goods and services
produced in the economy. It is crucial that energy be priced appropriately to correctly encourage
eﬃcient choices within and across diﬀerent energy sources. These choices are particularly important
given recent increased attention to the external costs of energy. In the United States, 81% of
greenhouse gas emissions are derived directly from the production and consumption of energy.1
There is a great deal of public interest, therefore, in making energy prices accurately reﬂect both
private and social costs.
The standard approach for addressing externalities is to use a Pigouvian tax, or similarly, a
cap-and-trade program. In the standard case, a tax works by increasing prices to reﬂect marginal
damages. Adding marginal damages on top of private marginal costs gives social marginal costs,
leading to the socially optimal level of production. This solution is predicated on the idea that, in
the absence of the tax, prices are equal to private marginal cost. This is a reasonable assumption
in perfectly competitive markets. However, this assumption may be less reasonable for markets
served by regulated natural monopolies, which include the vast majority of retail natural gas and
electricity sales in the United States. For these markets, the welfare consequences of a tax depend
on how regulated prices compare to private marginal cost. If regulated prices are not set equal to
marginal cost, the standard Pigouvian solution will not work and may actually exacerbate existing
market distortions.
We focus, in particular, on natural gas distribution in the United States. This is a clear
natural monopoly with high ﬁxed costs and low marginal costs. Like other monopolies, natural gas
distributors would, if left unregulated, maximize proﬁt by pricing above marginal cost. A standard
result in regulation is that it is possible to achieve the eﬃcient solution by using a two-part tariﬀ.
By setting marginal price equal to marginal cost, the regulator increases the level of production
and eliminates the deadweight loss associated with the monopoly. The regulator can then allow
the monopolist to recoup its ﬁxed costs by charging ﬁxed fees that do not depend on the level
of production. Two-part tariﬀs are commonly used in regulating natural gas distributors, with
customers paying both a ﬁxed monthly fee and a price per unit of consumption.
In this paper, we measure the extent to which actual two-part tariﬀs for natural gas diﬀer from
1U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United
States 2008”, DOE/EIA-0573, released December 2009.
1the theoretical ideal of marginal cost pricing. We ﬁnd that markups diﬀer dramatically by customer
class. While industrial customers face prices that are close to marginal cost, most residential and
commercial customers face prices closer to average cost, with most revenues coming from per-unit
charges rather than through ﬁxed monthly fees. Based on conservative estimates of the price
elasticity of demand, our results imply that the current pricing system yields annual welfare losses
of $2.7 billion compared to marginal cost pricing. This represents approximately 3 percent of the
$92 billion of total expenditures on natural gas in the United States in 2008.
On average, we estimate that residential and commercial customers face markups of over 40%
above marginal cost. The average markups for residential and commercial customers ($3.38 and
$3.05 per McF, respectively) are equivalent to taxes of over $55 per ton of carbon dioxide ($200
per metric ton of carbon).2 This is substantially higher than the level of a carbon tax envisioned
by most economists. As a point of comparison, Nordhaus (2007) calculates a baseline optimal tax
of $10 per ton of carbon dioxide.3 Thus, residential and commercial customers may already be
facing a marginal price that is above the social marginal cost of natural gas. If this is the case
then imposing a Pigouvian tax would move consumption in the wrong direction, further reducing
consumption below the eﬃcient level. The broader policy lesson from our analysis is that pre-
existing distortions from regulated natural monopolies are important to consider when evaluating
carbon taxes and other policies that would increase the marginal price of energy products.
We then discuss possible explanations for the observed rate structures. Cost recovery is a
central feature of the current regulatory environment, but cost recovery alone cannot explain why
per-unit charges tend to be marked up considerably while ﬁxed monthly fees are consistently very
low across states and customer classes. In part, this preference for low ﬁxed fees may reﬂect
eﬀorts by regulated companies to maximize the total number of customers and thus the total
rate base (see Sherman and Visscher, 1982). Distributional considerations provide an additional
and complementary explanation. Under current price schedules, high-volume customers pay a
disproportionately large share of ﬁxed costs and attempts to “levelize” price schedules typically face
substantial political opposition because higher ﬁxed fees would result in increased expenditures for
low-volume customers.
2U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Documentation for Emissions of Greenhouse
Gases in the United States (2005)”, October 2007, DOE/EIA-0638, Table 6-4. There are .0543 metric tons of carbon
dioxide (CO2) per thousand cubic feet (McF) of natural gas.
3A carbon tax of $35 per ton from Nordhaus (2007) implies a tax of $10 per ton of CO2 because the atomic weight
of carbon is 12 atomic mass units, while the weight of CO2 is 44, so one ton of carbon equals 44/12 tons of CO2. To
avoid confusion we use CO2 throughout.
2Finally, the paper considers available policy approaches for addressing these departures from
marginal cost pricing. One alternative is public ownership. Comparing revenues from municipally-
owned and investor-owned distribution companies, we ﬁnd that approximately 25 percent of a
municipally-owned utility’s ﬁxed costs are borne by taxpayers rather than consumers of natural gas.
Lower revenue requirements could allow municipally-owned companies to charge marginal prices
which are closer to marginal cost, reducing deadweight loss. Of course, these subsidies must be
ﬁnanced through taxes. Because the government cannot collect non-distortionary taxes, the welfare
eﬀects of public provision are ambiguous - welfare for natural gas consumers rises if subsidies lower
marginal prices, but tax collection introduces distortions in other parts of the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes relevant background information about the
organization of the natural gas market. Section 3 describes the seventeen-year state-level panel
of prices and quantities assembled for the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of our test of
marginal cost pricing and measures of the total welfare loss compared to marginal cost pricing.
Section 5 discusses the causes and consequences of the current rate structure with emphasis on
implications for carbon policy. Section 6 compares regulated prices for municipally-owned and
investor-owned distribution companies and section 7 concludes.
2 Background
This section provides a brief description of the organization of the U.S. natural gas market,
highlighting the features of the market that are relevant for the analysis and providing a bridge to
a substantial theoretical literature in industrial organization on the optimal regulation of natural
monopoly. For more information about the organization and regulatory history of the U.S. natural
gas market see Viscusi, Hamilton, and Vernon (2005) and U.S. Department of Energy (2010).
The natural gas market in the United States consists of gas producers, interstate pipeline
operators, and local distribution companies (“LDCs”). This paper focuses on LDCs and on the
price schedules faced by residential, commercial, and industrial customers. The costs in this market
are widely understood. The main ﬁxed cost for the LDC is the installation and maintenance of the
pipeline network. In addition, LDCs incur costs installing and maintaining gas meters, processing
bills, and taking customer service calls. These costs depend critically on the total number of
customers, and the “marginal customer cost”, i.e. the cost of adding an additional customer to
the network is substantial. In addition, LDCs purchase natural gas. Commodity cost for LDCs
3is measured by the “city gate price”, the price at which the LDC receives natural gas.4 The
marginal cost of distributing gas through the local pipeline network is virtually zero for all classes
of consumers. Our conversations with industry participants and examinations of industry ﬁlings
conﬁrm that line losses are negligible, representing a tiny fraction of total costs. Thus the marginal
cost of providing an additional unit of natural gas to an existing customer is well-approximated by
the city gate price.
LDCs are regulated by state utility commissions which set tariﬀ schedules for each customer
class using traditional rate-of-return techniques.5 Regulators create price schedules to equate total
revenues from all customer classes with total operating costs plus an allowed rate of return on
the ﬁrm’s capital expenditures. There are many diﬀerent price schedules which would satisfy the
zero proﬁt condition and several previous studies have considered the question of which schedule
yields the highest level of utility. If constrained to use linear prices, Boiteux (1956) shows that
the welfare-maximizing price markup is proportional to the inverse of the elasticity of demand.
Speciﬁcally, if a monopolist produces N goods (or serves N diﬀerent customer classes) with total
cost function C(x1,x2,...,xI) and faces inverse demand function pi(xi) for good i, a social planner
















where λ is a non-negative constant. These prices are called “Ramsey-Boiteux” prices because
the problem considered by Boiteux (1956) is formally identical to the constrained maximization
problem solved by Ramsey (1927).
When nonlinear prices can be used the regulator has more ﬂexibility. This is the case in practice
with natural gas distribution, where the dominant price schedule is a two-part tariﬀ.6 First, LDCs
typically charge customers a ﬁxed fee, typically levied monthly, that does not depend on the level
4From a research perspective, a signiﬁcant advantage of natural gas distribution compared to many other markets is
that marginal costs are observed. This is important because although an extensive literature in industrial organization
has been developed for inferring marginal cost based on pricing behavior, this approach is problematic for studies of
regulated ﬁrms because prices for these ﬁrms are established by regulators, causing the key identiﬁcation assumption
to fail. Not only do we observe marginal costs, but they are observed for all 50 states and at a monthly frequency
going back to 1991.
5Price controls on wellhead prices were a major feature of the U.S. natural gas market for much of the post-war
period (see e.g. Davis and Kilian, 2009) but were terminated in 1989 before the beginning of our sample period.
6Typically LDCs use simple two-part tariﬀs, although multiple-part tariﬀs are not uncommon. We examined the
2007 tariﬀ schedules of the twelve largest investor-owned distribution companies and the six largest municipally-owned
distribution companies. Two-part tariﬀs are the dominant price schedule throughout. For the LDCs we surveyed,
ten of the eighteen companies use multiple-part tariﬀs for at least one category of customers.
4of consumption. This fee varies by customer class - typically, industrial customers pay a higher
monthly fee than residential or commercial customers. In some cases, the ﬁxed fee also varies
within customer class - for example, residential customers who use natural gas for heating may be
charged a diﬀerent fee than residential customers who do not use natural gas for heating. Second,
customers pay a per-unit charge for each unit of natural gas that is consumed. This price includes
a commodity charge for natural gas purchased on their behalf by the local distribution company.
Commodity costs change throughout the year with the LDCs procurement costs and typically
changes in commodity costs are passed on relatively quickly to ﬁnal customers.7 In addition to
commodity costs, most companies also charge customers a per unit “transportation charge” per
unit of natural gas consumed. This is typically a price per unit, though in some cases commodity
costs are marked up by a ﬁxed percentage. As we illustrate in Section 4, these per unit fees imply
that LDC revenues are highly seasonal with LDCs collecting a large share of their total annual
revenue during cold, high-demand winter months.
In theory, with two-part tariﬀs a regulator can set marginal prices equal to marginal costs. As
ﬁrst suggested by Coase (1946), two-part tariﬀs can be adjusted such that the per-unit charge is
equal to marginal cost and the ﬁxed fee set to cover ﬁxed costs. For the relevant case with declining
average costs and constant marginal costs, this implies that the ﬁxed fee would be set equal to each
customer’s share of the LDC’s ﬁxed costs. Ng and Weisser (1974) and Sherman and Visscher
(1982) extend the analysis of two-part tariﬀs, solving for optimal tariﬀs with and without revenue
constraints. If this eﬃcient two-part tariﬀ is not suﬃcient to cover the monopolist’s ﬁxed costs,
then both prices are marked up by an amount inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand
for that margin.
In summary, this study examines the regulation of natural gas LDCs. A standard result in
regulation is that eﬃciency requires that marginal prices be set equal to marginal costs. The
availability of two-part tariﬀs makes it possible to use marginal cost pricing while still allowing the
LDC to recuperate ﬁxed costs. How marginal prices compare to marginal costs in practice is an
empirical question to which we turn in the following section.
7Friedman (1991, Section 3) provides a fascinating description of electricity and natural gas ratemaking in Cal-
ifornia under the California Public Utility Commission. Typically every three years there is a rate case with more
frequent rate adjustments for commodity cost changes. “Substantively, each case proceeds in the same way. First, the
utility’s revenue requirement and marginal costs are determined. Second, the commission comes to a broad decision
about how to allocate that revenue among customer classes. Finally, actual rates within classes are set to raise the
allotted revenue. See also Kahn (1994, Chapter 4) for additional description of the rate making process including a
detailed example from Paciﬁc Gas and Electric.”
53 Data
To measure the extent to which regulated prices diﬀer from marginal cost pricing, we assembled
a seventeen-year panel of natural gas sales and prices at the state-level. Our sample includes the
entire period for which data are available, January 1991 through December 2008. Natural gas sales
and prices come from the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Natural
Gas Navigator”. The Department of Energy constructs these data using a monthly survey (EIA
Form-857) of natural gas distribution companies. These data describe natural gas sales separately
for residential, commercial, industrial, and electric utility customers. See Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration, “Deﬁnitions, Sources and Explanatory Notes” for details.
In states with active retail choice programs such as Georgia, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia, the Energy Information Administration calculates natural gas sales and
prices come from both the monthly survey of LDCs (EIA Form-857) and a monthly survey of
natural gas marketers (EIA Form-910). In these states customers have a choice between buying
natural gas from their LDC and buying natural gas from independent natural gas marketers. The
LDC provides and is reimbursed for transportation services but marketers perform the ﬁnancial
transactions, procuring natural gas in the wholesale market and then selling it to ﬁnal customers.
For states with retail choice programs, our panel describes total sales and average prices for all
customers by state, month, and customer class.
In this paper, we focus on sales to residential, commercial and industrial customers. We omit
electric utility consumers. These facilities consume suﬃciently large amounts of natural gas such
that it is often proﬁtable to build a dedicated line directly to an interstate pipeline, contract with
suppliers directly and bypass the LDC. Consequently, LDCs have little bargaining power with
respect to electric utility customers and they tend to face very diﬀerent price schedules from other
customers. Similarly, among commercial and industrial customers, we exclude what are called
“non-core” customers.8 Whereas “core” customers must buy from the LDC, “non-core” customers
by virtue of their size or other factors can buy from third parties and then contract with the LDCs
for transportation services only. Much like electric utility customers, non-core customers have
negotiating power which allows them to typically obtain price schedules that are diﬀerent from the
schedules faced by most customers. Both the prices and quantities used in the analysis exclude
8While a relatively high proportion of commercial demand comes from “core” customers, most industrial customers
contract with wholesaler natural gas providers directly. From 2002 to 2007, approximately, 79% of commercial natural
gas demand came from “core” customers. For industrial demand, approximately 23% of demand came from “core”
customers.
6non-core customers.
Prices are available by state, month, and customer class and include all charges paid by end-
users including transportation costs as well as all federal, state and local taxes. Also available by
state and month are city gate prices, the price paid by the LDC when they receive deliveries at
the entrance to the distribution network. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the monthly
data: consumption and average delivered prices by customer class, city gate prices, the spot price
for North Sea crude oil (Brent Crude Spot Price), and heating degree days. All dollar values in the
paper have been normalized to reﬂect year 2007 prices. In addition to the monthly survey data from
EIA Form-857, we assembled annual utility-level data for the universe of distribution companies
delivering natural gas to end users from EIA Form-176. The EIA does not release any utility-level
data at the monthly level. In the annual data we observe sales, revenues, and number of customers
for each LDC. In addition, we know ﬁrm ownership, which allows us to compare regulated prices
of investor-owned and municipally-owned distribution companies in Section 6.
City gate prices play a critical role in the analysis that follows because they represent the
marginal cost of natural gas for LDCs. Our primary source of city gate prices is the Platts’ GASdat
database which describes daily natural gas spot prices from 131 diﬀerent locations throughout the
United States.9 Platts obtains these prices via surveys of trades made at each location and they
represent true natural gas spot prices. We aggregate these city gate prices to the monthly level and
then calculate state averages across all locations in a given state. For states without Platts survey
locations, prices from the closest available location are used.10
We also perform our empirical test of marginal cost pricing using an alternative set of city gate
prices derived from an entirely independent source. These alternative prices come from EIA Form-
857 and represent, the city gate prices reported by LDCs including, ‘commodity charges, monthly
minimum bill and/or take-or-pay charges, surcharges, refunds in the form of reduced charges,
charges incidental to underground storage of company-owned gas, and transportation charges paid
or incurred to deliver gas to your distribution area.” Although many of these costs indeed reﬂect
the true marginal cost of natural gas to the LDC, one might be concerned, for example, by the
monthly minimum bill charges which should be correctly thought of as a ﬁxed fee rather than as a
9In practice LDCs procure natural gas both on the spot market and in a forward market called the “bidweek
market” in which the LDC purchases a speciﬁed volume of natural gas every day over the course of a month.
Participating in this forward market reduces the volatility of expenditures but not the marginal cost of natural gas
because at the margin, LDCs always have the option to buy (or sell) natural gas on the spot market. See Borenstein,
Busse, and Kellogg (2009) for a detailed description of how LDCs procure natural gas.
10When performing the test with Platts data we exclude Alaska and Hawaii since there are no Platts survey
locations in or near these states.
7marginal cost. In addition, LDCs enter long-term contracts and engage in hedging transactions so
costs in a particular month may be a poor proxy for marginal commodity costs. These concerns lead
us to focus primarily on our measure of city gate prices from Platts. Nonetheless, it is reassuring
that the results are generally very similar using both measures.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for both measures of the city gate price. The price from
the EIA tends to be somewhat higher, consistent with including additional non-marginal costs.
Overall, however, the two prices track each other fairly accurately and the correlation between the
two monthly price series is 78.1%.11
The analysis which follows is performed at the monthly level. Although there is daily variation
in city gate prices, short-run variation in natural gas prices is mitigated by the ability of natural gas
suppliers to store natural gas. In the United States total natural gas storage capacity exceeds eight
trillion cubic feet, enough to meet total consumption for several months. In addition, natural gas
transmission lines themselves are a form of storage as they can accommodate a range of diﬀerent
levels of pressurization. With access to storage, natural gas suppliers are able to arbitrage within-
month price diﬀerences, and on average across states in our sample the month-to-month variation
represents 94% of the total variation in city gate prices whereas the within-month variation rep-
resents only 6%. Our deadweight loss estimates in Section 4.2 calculate the gain in welfare that
could be realized by moving to a system of monthly marginal cost pricing. Additional gains could
be realized by moving to marginal cost pricing where prices vary daily. Still, the monthly-level
counterfactual makes most sense from a policy standpoint. Current metering technology does not
record daily consumption levels, so a change to daily pricing would require large changes in meter-
ing infrastructure along the same lines currently being observed in electricity. Moreover, utilities
have been historically very resistant to more dynamic-forms of pricing, even in electricity markets
where cost-eﬀective storage is not available so the potential welfare gains are considerably larger.
11The largest deviation between EIA and Platts prices occurs in California in December 2000 following the El Paso
pipeline explosion that severely curtailed natural gas shipments. The Platts city gate price of $25.61 per McF is
substantially higher than the EIA city gate price of $8.75 per McF. We do not see the extremely high spot prices
being passed through to consumers; average revenues from residential customers in California in December 2000
were $12.56 per McF. The diﬀerence arises because the Platts price is based on spot transactions while the EIA price
reﬂects the use of long-term contracts and other hedging strategies by the LDCs. Because of the substantial diﬀerence
in this month, when conducting our test of marginal cost pricing, we drop the data for December 2000 in California.
84 Results
4.1 A Test of Marginal Cost Pricing
This section describes our test of marginal cost pricing and our estimation of per-unit markups.
Eﬃciency requires per-unit prices to be equal to the marginal commodity cost of natural gas. Or,
equivalently, eﬃciency requires that revenue net of commodity costs should not be a function of the
level of consumption. For each state, month, and customer class we calculate “net revenue”, the
total revenue collected by LDCs net of commodity costs. Next, we test if net revenue is a function
of the level of natural gas consumption.
The best way to understand our test is by example. Figure 1 plots consumption and net revenue
by month for residential natural gas customers in Massachusetts in 2006. Natural gas consumption
varies substantially throughout the year with per capita consumption increasing by a factor of ﬁve
between summer and winter months as more natural gas is used for home heating. Net revenue
follows a similar pattern, increasing substantially with per capita consumption and peaking in the
winter. In addition to the monthly observations, the ﬁgure also plots ﬁtted values from the following
regression equation:
NRt = α0 + α1qt + ǫt, t ∈ 1,2,...,12 (1)
where monthly net revenue from residential sales per customer, NRt, is regressed on monthly gas
consumption per customer, qt.
The variation in consumption during the course of the year traces the price schedule. The
intercept, α0, is the average amount paid in ﬁxed monthly fees and the slope, α1 is the average
per-unit markup over the city gate price. The price schedule for Massachusetts in 2006 indicates
that revenues tend to be collected from per-unit charges rather than from the ﬁxed monthly fee. As
a result, net revenue in winter months is many times higher than net revenue in summer months.
For our test of marginal cost pricing we estimate equation (1), allowing α0 and α1 to vary by state,
year, and customer class. The null hypothesis of marginal cost pricing is α1 = 0.
Table 2 presents the main results of our test of marginal cost pricing. Panel A reports F-
statistics by state over all years and customer classes, panel B reports F-statistics by year over
all states and customer classes, and panel C reports F-statistics by customer class over all states
and years. For all 48 states (Alaska and Hawaii excluded), all years and for all three customer
classes, we reject marginal cost pricing with p-values less than 0.001. Overall, the tests provide
9strong evidence of departures from marginal cost pricing.12 Our conclusions do not change if we use
the alternative city gate prices from EIA as our measure of marginal cost. Using this alternative
measure of marginal cost, we reject marginal cost pricing for all 50 states, all years, and all customer
classes.
Table 3 summarizes the per-unit markups borne by each customer class. On average, residential
consumers paid a 47.9% per-unit markup over the city gate price, equivalent to a $3.38 transporta-
tion fee per-unit. The per-unit markup for commercial customers is slightly lower, a 43.0% markup
equivalent to a $3.05 transportation fee per-unit. Markups are much lower for industrial customers
- industrial customers pay a 2.5% markup over the city gate on average, equivalent to a $0.16 trans-
portation fee per-unit. Overall, the results imply an average markup across all customer classes
of 38.4%. Using the EIA city gate prices, we ﬁnd similar markups - we estimate that the average
per-unit markup across all customer classes is 38.4%, equivalent to a $2.70 per-unit markup. In
the sections which follow we attempt to put these results in context, for example comparing our
estimated markups to the increase that would be implied by proposed carbon legislation.
In addition to markups, table 3 reports the fraction of total revenues collected from each cus-
tomer class. The results indicate that residential consumers were responsible for 71.1% of total
net revenues while receiving 54.1% of total core deliveries. In contrast, industrial customers were
responsible for 3.7% of total net revenues while receiving 18.4% of total core deliveries. Although
the pattern of revenues is interesting, these results should be interpreted with caution because it
is not clear how these collected revenues compare to marginal customer costs. For example, the
residential market is characterized by a large number of customers, each consuming a relatively
small amount of natural gas. For each customer the LDC must build and maintain an additional
connection, purchase and maintain metering equipment, and process bills. Residential customers
pay a large fraction of total revenue, but they also, therefore, impose a large fraction of total costs
and with the available evidence it is diﬃcult to make strong statements about the net burden borne
by diﬀerent customer classes.13
12In related work, Naughton (1982) tests the eﬃciency of price schedules for a sample of electric utilities in 1980.
After estimating marginal costs using a translog cost function, Naughton ﬁnds that the per-unit prices faced by all
customer classes exceed marginal costs.
13See Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) for discussion of the Stigler-Peltzman theory of regulation that argues
that regulators act to transfer wealth between interest groups.
104.2 Total Deadweight Loss From Non-Marginal Cost Pricing
To evaluate the total deadweight loss from the observed departures from marginal cost pricing,
we ﬁrst estimate the elasticity of demand for each sector. We then calculate the deadweight loss
associated with the current pricing schedules compared to marginal cost pricing.
For each customer class, we regress the log of monthly consumption per customer on the log
of average natural gas prices, state*month-of-year ﬁxed eﬀects and state*year ﬁxed eﬀects. The
state*month-of-year ﬁxed eﬀects allow for unique state-speciﬁc seasonal patterns in natural gas
consumption and state*year ﬁxed eﬀects allow demand in each state to change ﬂexibly with long-
run trends in income or housing growth. With state*month-of-year and state*year ﬁxed eﬀects, we
estimate our coeﬃcients oﬀ of deviations from mean seasonal patterns in each state. If long-run
demand is more elastic, our estimate of the deadweight loss relative to marginal cost pricing would
be conservative.
In addition, we include demand shifters appropriate for each customer class’ use of natural
gas. For the residential and commercial customers that use natural gas primarily for space heat-
ing, we include same-month demeaned heating and cooling degree days. Furthermore, we interact
demeaned heating and cooling degree days with prices to allow the elasticity to vary with temper-
ature. For industrial customers, who use natural gas for production, we omit heating and cooling
degree days. Rather, we include the spot price of Brent crude oil in the demand equation since
some industrial customers have the ability to switch between fuel oil and natural gas. For all three
customer classes, we instrument for natural gas prices using heating and cooling degree days in all
other states. For residential and commercial demand, we also use the Brent crude spot price as an
instrument for natural gas prices.
We present our demand elasticity estimates in table 4. We estimate that demand for natural
gas in all three sectors is inelastic. The elasticity point estimates for residential, commercial and
industrial users are −0.278, −0.205 and −0.709 respectively. We estimate that the elasticity of resi-
dential customers is negatively correlated with heating degree days - residential consumers respond
less to exogenous shifts in price during cold months. We estimate that a one standard deviation
increase in monthly heating degree days (419 degree days) increases the residential elasticity point
estimate by 0.115. In addition, we ﬁnd that the cross-price elasticity of industrial demand with
respect to the crude oil price is 0.333.
Table 5 reports deadweight loss generated by using existing pricing tariﬀs relative to marginal
11cost prices. We separately report deadweight loss for each customer class as well as block boot-
strapped standard errors.14 In total, we estimate that the existing price schedules create $2.7 billion
annually in deadweight loss, relative to marginal cost pricing. In the United States total expendi-
ture on natural gas in 2008 by core customers was $92 billion so this represents approximately 3%
of the total market.
These estimates provide a valuable preliminary assessment of the welfare consequences of the
observed departures from marginal cost pricing. However, it is important to emphasize that the
magnitude of the deadweight loss is sensitive to the elasticity of demand for natural gas. The
estimates from Table 4 provide a starting point but there is sampling variation in these estimates.
Moreover, the relevant demand elasticity for these calculations is the long-run demand elasticity
which is likely to be larger than the short-run elasticity because agents may employ additional
margins of adjustment. For example, in the long-run, consumers may purchase new heating equip-
ment and new appliances that uses natural gas. Because the stock of equipment turns over slowly,
the full long-run impact of a price change may not be realized for many years and estimating such
long-run eﬀects using historical data is extremely challenging. In order to assess sensitivity, Table
5 reports deadweight loss estimates for two alternative sets of demand elasticities. The magnitude
of the implied deadweight loss varies predictably with the choice of elasticities, but even under the
most conservative assumption (-.20 for all customers), total deadweight loss exceeds $1.6 billion
annually.
It is also important to note that is a partial equilibrium analysis and that these estimates of
deadweight loss ignore any eﬀects that a change in natural gas pricing would have on other markets.
In our thought experiment the price per unit of natural gas is decreased and set equal to marginal
cost. Everything else equal, this would increase demand for natural gas and decrease demand for
alternative energy sources such as electricity and oil. Because prices for these other energy sources
may also diﬀer from marginal cost, these changes could have additional welfare consequences. A
more comprehensive analysis would consider the complete set of available energy sources, the costs
and pricing in all sectors, and model substitution patterns both across and within energy categories.
14When calculating the deadweight loss, we assume that the number of customers using natural gas does not change.
If ﬁrms can accurately estimate consumer willingness to pay based on observable and non-mutable characteristics (e.g.
heating / non-heating residential) and price discriminate on ﬁxed fees, shifting to marginal cost pricing will create a
welfare gain along the extensive margin as well. Consequently, our estimates likely understate the true deadweight
loss.
125 Discussion of Possible Explanations
The results in the previous section provide strong evidence of departure from marginal cost
pricing in the U.S. natural gas distribution market. In this section, we consider several possible
explanations for the observed rate structure, all of which likely play a role in distorting prices away
from the theoretical ideal. We then discuss the implications of the current rate structure for carbon
policy and other public eﬀorts aimed at addressing the external costs of energy consumption.
5.1 Proﬁt Maximization by LDCs
One possible explanation for the current price schedules lies in the incentives created by rate-
of-return regulation. As described in the previous section, the central idea behind rate-of-return
regulation is that a ﬁrm’s revenues must equal its costs so that economic proﬁt is zero. In theory,
the ﬁrm’s allowed rate of return on capital investments should be set equal to the ﬁrm’s market
rate of return on capital for a riskless asset. In practice, however, the ﬁrm’s market rate of return
is imperfectly observed by regulators and face a diﬃcult tradeoﬀ. If they set the allowed rate of
return too low, the ability of the ﬁrm to raise capital can be threatened. If they set the allowed rate
of return too high, this yields positive proﬁts for the ﬁrm. Trying to balance these two objectives
and under pressure from regulated ﬁrms, the conventional wisdom is that in practice allowed rates
of return typically exceeds the market rate.15
When the allowed rate of return exceeds the market rate, the regulated ﬁrm has an incentive to
maximize the rate base. As pointed out by Sherman and Visscher (1982), the price schedule that
best allows the ﬁrm to increase the rate base depends on whether adding customers or increasing
output requires marginally the most capital. For natural gas distribution, capital depends most
importantly on the number of customers. More customers means more miles of network, more
connections, more metering equipment, etc. Although a large number of potential rate structures
satisfy the zero proﬁt condition, from the regulated ﬁrm’s perspective the optimal rate structure is
one with low ﬁxed monthly fees that will induce as many customers as possible to enter the market.16
Of course, low ﬁxed fees also mean high per-unit charges. However, decreased consumption along
the intensive margin is not costly from the regulated ﬁrm’s perspective because the rate base does
15See, e.g. Averch and Johnson (1962), Baumol and Klevorick (1970), and Joskow (1974).
16These incentives could also help explain the fact that monthly fees sometimes vary within customer class. For
example, some companies charge monthly fees for industrial customers that vary by historical consumption levels and
some companies charge diﬀerent monthly fees for residential customers depending on whether or they use natural gas
for heating. This price discrimination could be seen as a mechanism for inducing as many customers as possible into
the market.
13not depend on the level of natural gas consumption per customer. In short, under traditional rate-
of-return regulation a regulated ﬁrm attempts to maximize the rate base, and this creates incentive
for ﬁrms to lobby regulators for low ﬁxed fees.
In adjusting per-unit charges and ﬁxed monthly fees, the LDC faces a tradeoﬀ between small
and large customers. Small customers are sensitive to ﬁxed fees while large customers are sensitive
to the price per unit. Consider for example, a decrease in the ﬁxed fee that is oﬀset by an increase
in the price per unit. Such a change attracts small customers while potentially leading some large
consumers to switch to other energy sources. Whether or not such a change leads to a net increase or
decrease in the number of customers depends on the distribution of customers of diﬀerent sizes and
the ease with which they can substitute across fuels. For the rate-base maximizing explanation to
make sense, it must be the case that the current price schedules with low ﬁxed fees tend to increase
the customer base relative to alternative schedules. There would seem to be some support for this.
Particularly in the commercial and residential sectors there are a large number of smaller customers
who may indeed be sensitive to the ﬁxed fee. Moreover, there tend to be fewer large customers
and the largest customers (e.g. non-core industrial and commercial customers) are typically able
to negotiate alternative rate structures rather than switch to other energy sources.
From an eﬃciency standpoint, the important question in this context is how existing ﬁxed fees
compare to marginal connection costs. To add an additional customer requires connecting the
customer to the central distribution network. This connection cost depends on the distance from
the customer to the central network. In addition, LDCs incur costs installing and maintaining
meters, processing bills and providing customer service. Much of these additional costs should
be considered marginal connection costs. Our study reveals very low ﬁxed fees across states and
customer classes. Thus there would appear to be scope to improve eﬃciency by increasing ﬁxed
fees up to the level of marginal connection costs.
5.2 Distributional Considerations
Distributional considerations provide an alternative and complementary explanation for the
observed rate structure. With low ﬁxed fees the existing rates imply that within customer classes
high-demand customers pay a disproportionately large share of ﬁxed costs. Where monthly fees
are exactly zero, for example, a customer consuming 100 McF annually pays twice as much as a
customer consuming 50 McF despite the fact that the cost of providing distribution service to these
two customers is nearly identical. This structure may have progressive distributional consequences.
14If high-income households own large homes and consume high levels of natural gas, they will also
pay a large share of total costs. This distributional argument is highlighted in a recent rate case for
Bay State Gas before the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (emphasis
added).
The Attorney General also takes issue with the Company’s proposed residential delivery
rates (id. at 116-117). While the Company’s proposed block rates for the residential
rate classes, the Attorney General requests that the Company provide a ﬂat rate design
(i.e., no block charges) for the residential rate classes (id. at 117). The Attorney General
argues that a ﬂat rate design for the residential rate classes not only would simplify rate
design but would also provide lower bill impacts for all but those customers with higher
than average use.17
These distributional concerns make it politically diﬃcult to implement rate changes that would
increase ﬁxed fees. Although state and federal programs exist aimed at providing assistance to low-
income households with energy bills, there are concerns that these programs may not do enough for
vulnerable populations.18 Moreover, enrollment in means-tested subsidy programs is rarely high.
As an example, Borenstein (2010) cites an upper-bound of 78 percent for the take-up rate of the
CARE program, a heavily promoted, means-tested electricity subsidy in California.
More broadly, ﬁxed fees are salient to consumer protection groups and they are perceived as sub-
stantially impacting energy bills for low-income groups and small businesses. Absent accompanying
subsidies, lowering per-unit markups and increasing ﬁxed fees would shift the burden of ﬁxed costs
from high-usage to low-usage customers. As Reiss and White (2005) ﬁnds for electricity, non-linear
tariﬀs that increase the marginal price for high-usage customers may be preferable for distributional
reasons. In addition, they estimate that high-income households are less price-sensitive than low-
income households, strengthening the distributional argument for non-linear residential electricity
tariﬀs. Although no previous work to our knowledge has performed a similar distributional analysis
for natural gas demand or tariﬀs, many state boards cite distributional reasons when setting low
monthly fees and high or increasing marginal prices.
17Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy, DTE 05-27, p. 325.
18The largest such program, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) has been in operation
since 1982 and operates in all 50 states with a $4.5 billion dollar budget in 2009. Eligible household must meet income
requirements and typically assistance is awarded on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst serve basis.
155.3 Environmental Externalities
Environmental externalities provide a third possible explanation for the observed departures
from marginal cost pricing. Could it be the case that whether intended or unintended, the current
system of price schedules serves to eﬀectively internalize the external costs of energy? In this
section we consider this possibility, but conclude that the markups are considerably higher than
most available estimates in the literature for the external damages from natural gas consumption.
Section 4 showed that most customers face large per-unit charges for natural gas. The average
customer markup ($2.70 per McF) is equivalent to a tax of $50 per metric ton of CO2. Average
markups vary substantially across customer classes ranging from 2.5% for industrial customers to
47.9% for residential customers. For industrial customers, the average markup ($0.16) is equivalent
to a $3 tax per metric ton of CO2. In contrast, for residential and commercial customers the
average markups ($3.38 and $3.05, respectively) are equivalent to a tax of $62 and $56 per metric
ton of CO2. Interestingly, these markups straddle markups implied by the range of carbon taxes
envisioned by most economists. For example, Nordhaus (2007) calculates a baseline optimal tax
of $10 and Metcalf (2007) calls for a $15 tax. Regardless of one’s views on the marginal external
costs of CO2 emissions, it is critical that carbon policy take into account pre-existing distortions
in the market. Based on $10 or $15 taxes, for example, the current per-unit price of natural gas
for residential and commercial customers already exceeds marginal social costs.19
Given recent attention to the issue of climate change it makes sense to consider the implications
of current pricing schedules for carbon. However, it also makes sense to consider local pollutants
such as nitrogen oxides and particulates.20 Natural gas combustion releases .09 pounds of nitrogen
oxides and .007 pounds of particulates per McF.21 Using estimates from Muller and Mendelsohn
19In related work, Buchanan (1969), Barnett (1980), and Oates and Strassman (1984) consider Pigouvian taxes in
the context of an unregulated monopoly.
20There may also be negative externalities from emerging forms of natural gas production. There is currently a
great deal of excitement in the natural gas market about shale gas. Natural gas producers have long known that
shale and other rock deposits contain large amounts of natural gas. It was not until recently, however, that horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology improved enough to make these supplies accessible at reasonably low cost.
Seem e.g., D. Rotman “Natural Gas Changes the Energy Map,” MIT Technology Review, November 2009. See also
“America’s Natural Gas Revolution” Wall Street Journal, 11/3/2009 and “Has Natural Gas’s Moment Come?” Wall
Street Journal, 12/16/2009. These developments suggest that natural gas is going to continue to be an important
part of the energy portfolio in the United States for many years to come. These technologies also, however, raise
potential environmental concerns and in particular concerns about water consumption, though these potential costs
are still poorly understood.
21U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, ‘Natural Gas 1998: Issues and Trends”, DOE-
EIA-0560(1998), released April 1999, Chapter 2: Natural Gas and the Environment, Table 2. See also U.S. De-
partment of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Review”, DOE/EIA-0384(2007), released
June 2008, Table 12.7a. Natural gas is the cleanest of all major fossil fuels. Per unit of energy, natural gas combus-
tion releases 80% less nitrogen oxides, 90% less particulates, and over 99% less sulfur dioxide and mercury than oil
16(2009), the external costs of these emissions are less than 3 cents per McF, equivalent to a markup
over average residential prices of about one ﬁfth of one percent. Of course, marginal damages from
local pollutants depend on the proximity between the location of emissions and population centers.
However, even the 99% percentile estimates from Muller and Mendelsohn imply markups of less
than 1% over average residential prices.22 Thus with neither carbon emissions nor with emissions
of local pollutants would it appear that external costs justify the size of markups that are currently
observed.
Nevertheless, the presence of external costs imply that the deadweight loss estimates in Table
5 may somewhat overstate the total welfare cost of the observed departures from marginal cost
pricing. In Table 6, we present deadweight loss estimates that take into account that, due to
external costs, the socially optimal level of natural gas consumption is lower than what would be
implied by pricing at private marginal cost. We present results for three diﬀerent values of the
marginal cost of CO2 emissions: $0 per ton, $10 per ton, and $15 per ton. In each case, we use
our elasticity estimates from Table 4. As a point of reference, $10 per ton of CO2 is equivalent
to a markup of $0.54 per Mcf, $15/ton of CO2 is equivalent to a markup of $0.81 per Mcf. The
ﬁrst column is identical to the results reported in Table 5. Without incorporating the cost of CO2
emissions, we estimate total deadweight losses of $2.7 billion dollars per year. Using a cost of
$10/ton of CO2, our deadweight loss estimate falls to $2.5 billion dollars per year. Using a cost of
$15/ton of CO2, our deadweight loss estimate falls further to $2.4 billion dollars per year.
6 Ownership Structure and Eﬃciency
There are several available approaches for addressing these departures from marginal cost pric-
ing. There are many alternative rate structures which could improve eﬃciency while allowing LDCs
to recoup their investments. In the conclusion we discuss rate “levelization”, which would increase
ﬁxed fees while decreasing per unit prices.
combustion.
22Muller and Mendelsohn (2009), use an integrated assessment model to track and value emissions from 10,000
point and aggregated non-point sources in the United States. Average marginal damages from Table 1 are $1.61 per
pound of particulates (PM2.5) and $.13 per pound of nitrogen oxides. The 99th percentile of marginal damages is
$6.20 per pound of particulates (PM2.5) and $.55 per pound of nitrogen oxides. Alternative, and somewhat larger
estimates of the marginal damages of nitrogen oxide emissions come from Muller, Tong, and Mendelsohn (2009)
using the Community Multi-scale Air Quality model (CMAQ) rather than the reduced-form Air Pollution Emission
Experiments and Policy (APEEP) model used in Muller and Mendelsohn (2009). With CMAQ, marginal damages
from ground-level nitrogen oxide emissions from nine locations in and around Atlanta (Table 1) average $.27 per
pound with a maximum of $.55.
17An alternative approach for lowering per-unit prices is public provision. Energy utilities in the
United States operate under one of two types of institutional arrangements: (1) privately-owned
companies regulated by state public utility commissions, and (2) publicly-owned or “municipally-
owned” companies that are directly under public control. In both cases, the public sector controls
rate setting. However, unlike privately-owned companies which must recoup ﬁxed costs from end
users of natural gas, municipally-owned companies can recoup ﬁxed costs through government
subsidies, thereby shifting the burden of ﬁxed costs from natural gas consumers to taxpayers.
Consequently, a municipally-owned LDC may oﬀer a price schedule with lower per-unit markups.
Still, as we discuss in this section the welfare eﬀects of public provision are ambiguous because
subsidies must be ﬁnanced through distortionary taxes.
Municipal ownership is common in natural gas distribution. In 2007, approximately two-thirds
of LDCs were municipally-owned (848 out of a total of 1,229). On average, municipally-owned
LDCs are much smaller than investor-owned LDCs. In total, municipally-owned LDCs delivered
only eight percent of the natural gas to end-users in 2007. Despite diﬀerences in mean deliver-
ies, the size distributions of municipally-owned and investor-owned LDCs overlap substantially.
Approximately 45 percent of municipal utilities and 34 percent of investor-owned utilities deliver
between 100 million cubic feet of gas a year and 10 billion cubic feet of gas per year. Municipal util-
ities and investor-owned utilities are comparable on other observable dimensions. For the average
municipally-owned distribution company, 41 percent, 25 percent and 33 percent of deliveries are
made to residential, commercial and industrial customers. In comparison, 42 percent, 26 percent
and 30 percent of deliveries of investor-owned utilities go to residential, commercial and industrial
customers.
To estimate the proportion of municipal utility ﬁxed costs borne by taxpayers, we calculate
annual net revenues for each distribution company using the utility-level data from 1997 to 2007.
In total, we observe 9,426 company-years of municipal data and 3,755 company-years of investor-
owned data. In this case, we calculate net revenues for each LDC using the city-gate prices reported
by the EIA rather than the Platts spot price data. The city-gate averages reported by the EIA
measure the average natural gas procurement cost by state, including both spot transactions as
well as long-term contracts. Thus, net revenues calculated using the EIA data provide the best
proxy for the amount of ﬁxed costs covered by the regulated price schedule.
We compare the net revenues earned by comparably-sized municipally-owned and investor-
owned distribution companies. Table 7 presents the results from regressing annual net revenues for
18each ﬁrm on total deliveries (as a proxy for ﬁrm size), the proportion of deliveries made to industrial
or electric customers (to account for diﬀerences in the composition of end users), population density,
and a dummy variable corresponding to whether the distribution company is municipally-owned.
In each speciﬁcation, we include state ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Controlling for size and
customer composition, we expect municipal utilities and investor-owned utilities to have similar
ﬁxed costs. Absent the ability of the government to ﬁscally subsidize a municipal utility, the ﬁrms
should require similar net revenues. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) include all ﬁrms, while speciﬁcations
(3) and (4) restrict the sample to the portion of the ﬁrm size distribution where substantial overlap
between municipally-owned and investor-owned LDCs exists - between 100 million and 5 billion
cubic feet of delivered gas per year. Restricting the sample to mid-sized distribution companies
does not substantially aﬀect the results. In all four regressions we estimate a positive coeﬃcient on
annual deliveries between 0.805 and 0.950 - in all cases, the estimates are statistically distinguish-
able from 1 - consistent with a natural monopoly exhibiting economies of scale. We estimate that
a 10 percentage point increase in the share of deliveries to large (industrial/electric) customers is
associated with a 12-13 percent reduction in net revenues. Finally, we estimate that, conditional
on observables, municipally-owned distribution companies collect approximately 25 to 30 percent
less net revenues through their service rates than investor-owned utilities. This is consistent with
substantial direct subsidies to municipally-owned LDCs that allow these LDCs to collect consider-
ably less revenue from natural gas customers. Without monthly utility-level data it is impossible
to say whether this comes in the form of lower markups, lower ﬁxed fees (or both). 23
The overall welfare impact of direct subsidies depends, therefore, on the marginal cost of public
funds. While subsidies increase the welfare of natural gas users, these gains are oﬀset by tax
distortions in other parts of the economy. As a thought exercise, we calculate the threshold cost of
public funds which lead a 25 percent subsidy of ﬁxed costs to be welfare neutral. We estimate that
a 25 percent subsidy of the per unit transportation fee requires $5.85 billion per year to cover lost
revenues and is associated with a welfare gain of $733 million to natural gas users. Consequently,
the welfare-neutral threshold cost of public funds is roughly 12 cents per dollar. If a jurisdiction can
collect taxes which introduce less than 12 cents of deadweight loss per dollar of revenue generated
23An alternative explanation is that regulators allow investor-owned or privately-owned utilities to earn substan-
tially higher proﬁt than those earned by a municipally-owned LDC. To check, we examined the 2007 annual reports
of the six largest municipally-owned LDCs. In 2007, the six municipally-owned LDCs examined received direct and
indirect subsidies. Subsidies took the form of government grants to cover operation, repairs and construction, access
to subsidized government and cooperative natural gas supplies, and the ability to issue tax-exempt government bonds
and commercial paper.
19(and the cost of public versus private provision are similar), public subsidization of the ﬁxed costs
of operation may improve welfare if used to reduce per-unit markups.
Of course, there are other advantages and disadvantages of private ownership. A large literature
in economics examines the eﬀect of ﬁrm ownership on operating eﬃciency. See, e.g., Olley and
Pakes (1996), Joskow (1997), Ng and Seabright (2001) and Wolfram (2007). Privately-owned
LDCs typically have more incentive than publicly-owned LDCs to reduce costs. Rate-of-return
regulation guarantees privately-owned LDCs a certain rate of return on investments, but because
of regulatory lag these ﬁrms have an incentive for cost-reduction between rate cases. Moreover,
managers of privately-owned LDC may be more motivated because of the threat that they would
be replaced by a disappointed regulator whereas management in publicly-owned LDCs face less
threat of takeover. On the other hand, eﬀective regulation of privately-owned LDCs is diﬃcult
because the regulatory agency needs detailed information about the ﬁrm’s costs and the regulatory
proceedings used to elicit this information require time and resources. In addition, regulation of
privately-owned LDCs may introduce additional ineﬃciencies such as overcapitalization (Averch
and Johnson, 1962).
7 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of the U.S. natural gas distribution market supports the following conclusions.
First, we strongly reject marginal cost pricing. This result holds individually and jointly for all 50
states, all seventeen years and for residential and commercial customer classes. Second, markups
above marginal cost are largest for residential and commercial customers, averaging 47.9% and
45.0%, respectively. Markups for industrial customers are much lower, averaging only 2.5%. Third,
for conservative estimates of the price elasticity of demand, these distortions impose large aggregate
welfare losses compared to marginal cost pricing. In short, the current system with low ﬁxed fees
and high per unit prices implies that there are too many natural gas customers, each consuming
too little natural gas.
The most natural approach to addressing these departures from marginal cost pricing would
be to have regulators work with LDCs to “levelize” rate structures, increasing monthly fees and
lowering the price charged per unit. There is some precedent for this. For example, in May 2008 a
new rate structure was approved for Duke Energy Ohio in which the monthly ﬁxed delivery charge
increased from $4.50 to $10.00 with an oﬀsetting reduction in per-unit prices. The Public Utilities
20Commission of Ohio (PUCO) argued that the new “levelized” rate structure is more equitable,
“making sure that each customer pays only their share of the costs Duke must cover to deliver gas
to their home.” According to PUCO, the costs of natural gas distribution including installing and
maintaining pipelines, reading gas meters, processing bills, and taking customer service calls is the
same “whether a customer uses a little natural gas each month, or a lot.”
Carbon taxes could then be added to the “levelized” rates to ensure that customers pay the
socially eﬃcient price. Proceeding in this way would ensure that carbon policy works as it is
designed. Levelized rates combined with a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program would make
natural gas prices accurately reﬂect both private and social costs, encouraging eﬃcient choices
within and across energy sources. Natural gas is cleaner than other fossil fuels, but less clean
than energy from renewables so some policymakers have argued that natural gas can serve as a
bridge to a less carbon-intensive economy. Moreover, many industry observers believe that recent
developments in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology have ensured that natural
gas will continue to play an important role in the United States’ energy portfolio. It is crucial
that natural gas be priced appropriately if these new sources are to be developed eﬃciently, and if
energy consumers are to make eﬃcient consumption and capital choices.
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25Table 1: Summary Statistics, by Sector
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Monthly Consumption (millions cubic feet)
Residential 12,172 7,806 12,900 12 104,000
Commercial 12,139 4,854 6,454 37 51,600
Industrial 4,671 11,600 22,200 0 198,000
Electric 4,527 10,100 21,500 0 193,000
Monthly Consumption Per Customer (Mcf per Customer)
Residential 11,623 7.00 5.55 0.54 31.30
Commercial 11,608 52.31 34.59 2.17 284.31
Industrial 4,150 50478 159474 14.27 1167727
Average Delivered Price ($2008 per McF)
Residential 12,171 11.45 4.63 3.00 57.38
Commercial 12,160 8.84 3.48 2.11 74.57
Industrial 4,684 8.82 3.06 1.44 32.71
Electric 2,657 7.44 2.54 1.34 25.83
City Gate Price ($2008 per McF) 12,169 5.78 2.66 0.40 37.74
City Gate Price from Platts ($2008 per McF) 10,584 4.42 2.17 1.06 25.61
Brent Spot Price ($2008 per bbl) 11,628 33.42 16.05 12.20 92.41
Heating Degree Days 11,040 431.1 419.4 0 2109
Note: Consumption and price data for residential and commercial customers begin in 1989. Consumption
and price data for industrial customers begin in 2001. Customer counts are unavailable for 2008. Platts
Spot Prices are unavailable for 1989, 2008 and for the states of Alaska and Hawaii.
26Table 2: A Test of Marginal Cost Pricing in U.S. Natural Gas Distri-
bution, 1991-2007
Panel A. By State
F Statistic (p-value) F Statistic (p-value)
Alabama 57.7 (<.001) Nebraska 49.8 (<.001)
Arizona 400.7 (<.001) Nevada 201.1 (<.001)
Arkansas 97.6 (<.001) New Hampshire 119.3 (<.001)
California 11.8 (<.001) New Jersey 158.0 (<.001)
Colorado 12.2 (<.001) New Mexico 17.2 (<.001)
Connecticut 228.5 (<.001) New York 19.0 (<.001)
Delaware 77.3 (<.001) North Carolina 73.6 (<.001)
Florida 12.4 (<.001) North Dakota 15.5 (<.001)
Georgia 20.8 (<.001) Ohio 27.6 (<.001)
Idaho 113.2 (<.001) Oklahoma 40.8 (<.001)
Illinois 18.0 (<.001) Oregon 11.7 (<.001)
Indiana 38.1 (<.001) Pennsylvania 27.9 (<.001)
Iowa 36.1 (<.001) Rhode Island 260.0 (<.001)
Kansas 46.2 (<.001) South Carolina 62.7 (<.001)
Kentucky 38.1 (<.001) South Dakota 23.1 (<.001)
Louisiana 14.9 (<.001) Tennessee 45.1 (<.001)
Maine 76.7 (<.001) Texas 13.9 (<.001)
Maryland 38.0 (<.001) Utah 28.5 (<.001)
Massachusetts 53.7 (<.001) Vermont 169.5 (<.001)
Michigan 9.2 (<.001) Virginia 61.9 (<.001)
Minnesota 31.5 (<.001) Washington 11.3 (<.001)
Mississippi 31.4 (<.001) West Virginia 152.2 (<.001)
Missouri 58.7 (<.001) Wisconsin 54.0 (<.001)
Montana 60.8 (<.001) Wyoming 15.6 (<.001)
Panel B. By Year
F Statistic (p-value) F Statistic (p-value)
Year 1991 285.4 (<.001) Year 1992 143.4 (<.001)
Year 1993 313.5 (<.001) Year 1994 150.3 (<.001)
Year 1995 88.2 (<.001) Year 1996 5.1 (<.001)
Year 1997 77.4 (<.001) Year 1998 199.6 (<.001)
Year 1999 147.8 (<.001) Year 2000 1.8 (<.001)
Year 2001 9.0 (<.001) Year 2002 48.0 (<.001)
Year 2003 5.0 (<.001) Year 2004 15.4 (<.001)
Year 2005 9.4 (<.001) Year 2006 82.6 (<.001)
Year 2007 37.6 (<.001)
Panel C. By Customer Class
All States, Residential Customers Only 21.4 (<.001)
All States, Commercial Customers Only 17.5 (<.001)
All States, Industrial Customers Only 0.9 (=0.96)
All States, Pooled 20.16 (<.001)
Note: The F-statistic for the tests by state are joint tests over all years and cus-
tomer classes in a particular state. For residential and commercial customers,
consumption, revenue and marginal cost data are available for all states ex-
cept Alaska and Hawaii for the period 1991-2007. Industrial utility customers
data are available from 2001, though observations are missing for some states
and years. We dropped data for a particular state-class-year if more that six
monthly observations are missing. Thus typically for a given state there are a
total of 41 estimates of α1 and the F-statistic is a joint test that α1 is equal to
zero for all customer classes and years. The F-statistic for the tests by customer
class are joint tests over all states and years. Thus there are 867 estimates of
α1 for the residential tests, 869 estimates of alpha for the commercial tests and
350 estimates of α1 for the industrial test. The pooled test is a joint test over
2086 α1 parameters. All F-statistics cluster by state.
27Table 3: Average Deliveries, Revenues, and Markups By Customer Class
Per-Unit Markup
Over City Gate Price
Fraction of Total Fraction of Total
Core LDC Deliveries LDC Net Revenues Percent Levels (per McF)
Residential Customers 54.1% 71.1% 47.9% $3.38
(0.7%) (0.04)
Commercial Customers 27.3% 25.2% 43.0% $3.05
(0.7%) (0.05)
Industrial Customers 18.4% 3.7% 2.5% $0.16
(4.2%) (0.27)
All Customers, Pooled 100.0% 100.0% 38.4% $2.70
(0.9%) ($0.05)
Note: The table reports averages across all available states for 2002-2007 for which data is available for all
sectors, weighted by natural gas consumption in each state. Pooled markups are weighted by natural gas
consumption for each customer class. Per-unit markups are normalized to year 2007 dollars. Deliveries
to electric generators and non-core industrial and commercial customers excluded. Standard errors in
parentheses are block bootstrapped by state.
28Table 4: Demand Elasticity, by Customer Class
Residential Commercial Industrial






Log(Brent Crude Price) 0.333**
(0.146)
Heating Degree Days (000s) 0.166* 0.614***
(0.089) (0.111)
Cooling Degree Days (000s) -0.491** -0.016
(0.202) (0.283)
Observations 11619 11607 4147
R2 0.986 0.973 0.994
Note: The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics on the excluded instruments for de-
livered natural gas prices to residential, commercial and industrial
customers and 5.7, 7.2 and 22.6, all of which are signiﬁcant at a p-
value less than 0.001. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics on the excluded in-
struments for the residential and commercial interaction terms with
heating and cooling degree days are 145.2, 253.5, 119.7 and 350.9.
Residential and commercial elasticities are estimated using data from
1989 to 2007. Industrial elasticities are estimated using data from
2001 to 2007. All speciﬁcations include state*month-of-year and
state*year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard Errors clustered by state. *,**,***
denote signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
29Table 5: Estimates of Annual Deadweight Loss (in Millions), U.S. Natural Gas Distribution
Market 2001-2007
Using Elasticities Setting All Setting All
From Table 4 Elasticities = -0.2 Elasticities = -0.5
Residential Customers 1,297 968 2,683
(535) (24) (69)
Commercial Customers 524 485 1,354
(241) (18) (54)
Industrial Customers 897 189 543
(492) (19) (55)
All Customers, Pooled 2,719 1,642 4,580
(771) (34) (101)
Note: To calculate total DWL for all customers, we limit the analysis to years with a balanced panel,
2001 to 2007. Including 1991 to 2000 for residential and commercial DWL calculations does not
qualitatively change the annual deadweight loss relative to marginal cost pricing. Standard errors
are block bootstrapped by state with 1000 replications. For each bootstrap sample in column (1), we
re-estimate the price schedules and elasticities. For each bootstrap sample in columns (2) and (3),
we re-estimate the price schedules and take the elasticity as given.
Table 6: Estimates of Annual Deadweight Loss Accounting for Carbon Costs (in Millions), U.S.
Natural Gas Distribution Market 2001-2007
Assuming Marginal Assuming Marginal Assuming Marginal
Cost of Carbon Cost of Carbon Cost of Carbon
of $0 per ton of $35 per ton of $55 per ton
Residential Customers 1,297 1,197 1,146
(535) (491) (468)
Commercial Customers 524 485 465
(241) (222) (212)
Industrial Customers 897 809 770
(492) (434) (407)
All Customers, Pooled 2,719 2,491 2,381
(771) (696) (659)
Note: To calculate total DWL for all customers, we limit the analysis to years with a balanced panel, 2001
to 2007. Including 1991 to 2000 for residential and commercial DWL calculations does not qualitatively
change the annual deadweight loss relative to marginal cost pricing. Standard errors are block bootstrapped
by state with 1000 replications. For all cases, we use the estimated elasticities from Table 4 to calculate
deadweight loss.
30Table 7: Net Revenues of Municipally- and Investor-Owned LDCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Annual Deliveries) 0.873*** 0.950*** 0.805*** 0.903***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.024)
Municipally-Owned -0.314*** -0.265*** -0.310*** -0.251***
(0.052) (0.045) (0.074) (0.066)
Share of Deliveries -1.347*** -1.200***
to Industrial Customers (0.081) (0.106)
Population Density 0.313 1.024*
(0.389) (0.614)
Full Sample X X
Mid-sized Firms Only X X
Observations 11289 11289 4965 4965
R-squared 0.90 0.91 0.67 0.70
Note: All speciﬁcations include state ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Standard Errors clustered by company. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at
the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
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